diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs b/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
index 89b523ece..b4cc6a302 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/mod.rs
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ impl ClaimId {
 		}
 		ClaimId(Sha256::from_engine(engine).to_byte_array())
 	}
-	pub(crate) fn with_bytes(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> ClaimId {
+	pub(crate) fn step_with_bytes(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> ClaimId {
 		let mut engine = Sha256::engine();
 		engine.input(&self.0);
 		engine.input(bytes);
diff --git a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
index ec214556d..651338383 100644
--- a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
@@ -127,12 +127,21 @@ pub enum BumpTransactionEvent {
 	/// feerate of the commitment transaction is already sufficient, in which case the child anchor
 	/// transaction is not needed and only the commitment transaction should be broadcast.
 	///
+	/// In zero-fee commitment channels, the commitment transaction and the anchor transaction
+	/// form a 1-parent-1-child package that conforms to BIP 431 (known as TRUC transactions).
+	/// The anchor transaction must be version 3, and its size must be no more than 1000 vB.
+	/// The anchor transaction is usually needed to bump the fee of the commitment transaction
+	/// as the commitment transaction is not explicitly assigned any fees. In those cases the
+	/// anchor transaction must be broadcast together with the commitment transaction as a
+	/// `child-with-parents` package (usually using the Bitcoin Core `submitpackage` RPC).
+	///
 	/// The consumer should be able to sign for any of the additional inputs included within the
-	/// child anchor transaction. To sign its anchor input, an [`EcdsaChannelSigner`] should be
-	/// re-derived through [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. The anchor input signature
+	/// child anchor transaction. To sign its keyed-anchor input, an [`EcdsaChannelSigner`] should
+	/// be re-derived through [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. The anchor input signature
 	/// can be computed with [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_keyed_anchor_input`], which can then
 	/// be provided to [`build_keyed_anchor_input_witness`] along with the `funding_pubkey` to
-	/// obtain the full witness required to spend.
+	/// obtain the full witness required to spend. Note that no signature or witness data is
+	/// required to spend the keyless anchor used in zero-fee commitment channels.
 	///
 	/// It is possible to receive more than one instance of this event if a valid child anchor
 	/// transaction is never broadcast or is but not with a sufficient fee to be mined. Care should
@@ -183,14 +192,25 @@ pub enum BumpTransactionEvent {
 		pending_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
 	},
 	/// Indicates that a channel featuring anchor outputs has unilaterally closed on-chain by a
-	/// holder commitment transaction and its HTLC(s) need to be resolved on-chain. With the
-	/// zero-HTLC-transaction-fee variant of anchor outputs, the pre-signed HTLC
-	/// transactions have a zero fee, thus requiring additional inputs and/or outputs to be attached
-	/// for a timely confirmation within the chain. These additional inputs and/or outputs must be
-	/// appended to the resulting HTLC transaction to meet the target feerate. Failure to meet the
-	/// target feerate decreases the confirmation odds of the transaction, possibly resulting in a
-	/// loss of funds. Once the transaction meets the target feerate, it must be signed for and
-	/// broadcast by the consumer of the event.
+	/// holder commitment transaction and its HTLC(s) need to be resolved on-chain. In all such
+	/// channels, the pre-signed HTLC transactions have a zero fee, thus requiring additional
+	/// inputs and/or outputs to be attached for a timely confirmation within the chain. These
+	/// additional inputs and/or outputs must be appended to the resulting HTLC transaction to
+	/// meet the target feerate. Failure to meet the target feerate decreases the confirmation
+	/// odds of the transaction, possibly resulting in a loss of funds. Once the transaction
+	/// meets the target feerate, it must be signed for and broadcast by the consumer of the
+	/// event.
+	///
+	/// In zero-fee commitment channels, you must set the version of the HTLC claim transaction
+	/// to version 3 as the counterparty's signature commits to the version of
+	/// the transaction. You must also make sure that this claim transaction does not grow
+	/// bigger than 10,000 vB, the maximum vsize of any TRUC transaction as specified in
+	/// BIP 431. It is possible for [`htlc_descriptors`] to be long enough such
+	/// that claiming all the HTLCs therein in a single transaction would exceed this limit.
+	/// In this case, you must claim all the HTLCs in [`htlc_descriptors`] using multiple
+	/// transactions. Finally, note that while HTLCs in zero-fee commitment channels no
+	/// longer have the 1 CSV lock, LDK will still emit this event only after the commitment
+	/// transaction has 1 confirmation.
 	///
 	/// The consumer should be able to sign for any of the non-HTLC inputs added to the resulting
 	/// HTLC transaction. To sign HTLC inputs, an [`EcdsaChannelSigner`] should be re-derived
@@ -211,6 +231,7 @@ pub enum BumpTransactionEvent {
 	///
 	/// [`EcdsaChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner
 	/// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction
+	/// [`htlc_descriptors`]: `BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution::htlc_descriptors`
 	HTLCResolution {
 		/// The `channel_id` of the channel which has been closed.
 		channel_id: ChannelId,
@@ -500,13 +521,16 @@ where
 				preexisting_tx_weight,
 			));
 			selected_utxos = VecDeque::new();
+			// Invariant: `selected_utxos_weight` is never greater than `max_coin_selection_weight`
 			let mut selected_utxos_weight = 0;
 			for (utxo, fee_to_spend_utxo) in eligible_utxos {
-				if selected_amount >= target_amount_sat + total_fees
-					&& selected_utxos_weight <= max_coin_selection_weight
-				{
+				if selected_amount >= target_amount_sat + total_fees {
 					break;
 				}
+				// First skip any UTXOs with prohibitive satisfaction weights
+				if BASE_INPUT_WEIGHT + utxo.satisfaction_weight > max_coin_selection_weight {
+					continue;
+				}
 				// If adding this UTXO to `selected_utxos` would push us over the
 				// `max_coin_selection_weight`, remove UTXOs from the front to make room
 				// for this new UTXO.
@@ -526,9 +550,7 @@ where
 				selected_utxos_weight += BASE_INPUT_WEIGHT + utxo.satisfaction_weight;
 				selected_utxos.push_back((utxo.clone(), fee_to_spend_utxo));
 			}
-			if selected_amount < target_amount_sat + total_fees
-				|| selected_utxos_weight > max_coin_selection_weight
-			{
+			if selected_amount < target_amount_sat + total_fees {
 				log_debug!(
 					self.logger,
 					"Insufficient funds to meet target feerate {} sat/kW while remaining under {} WU",
@@ -1055,7 +1077,7 @@ where
 			};
 			broadcasted_htlcs += batch_size;
 			batch_size = htlc_descriptors.len() - broadcasted_htlcs;
-			utxo_id = claim_id.with_bytes(&broadcasted_htlcs.to_be_bytes());
+			utxo_id = claim_id.step_with_bytes(&broadcasted_htlcs.to_be_bytes());
 
 			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 			let input_satisfaction_weight: u64 =
diff --git a/lightning/src/events/mod.rs b/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
index d7a13d59e..cccbabbbd 100644
--- a/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
@@ -1604,8 +1604,10 @@ pub enum Event {
 	/// Indicates that a transaction originating from LDK needs to have its fee bumped. This event
 	/// requires confirmed external funds to be readily available to spend.
 	///
-	/// LDK does not currently generate this event unless the
-	/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`] config flag is set to true.
+	/// LDK does not currently generate this event unless either the
+	/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`] or the
+	/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchor_zero_fee_commitments`] config flags are set to
+	/// true.
 	/// It is limited to the scope of channels with anchor outputs.
 	///
 	/// # Failure Behavior and Persistence
@@ -1613,6 +1615,7 @@ pub enum Event {
 	/// returning `Err(ReplayEvent ())`), but will only be regenerated as needed after restarts.
 	///
 	/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx
+	/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchor_zero_fee_commitments`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchor_zero_fee_commitments
 	BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent),
 	/// We received an onion message that is intended to be forwarded to a peer
 	/// that is currently offline. This event will only be generated if the

diff --git a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
index 651338383..92fcea5a7 100644
--- a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs
@@ -1063,11 +1063,9 @@ where
 			{
 				Ok(selection) => selection,
 				Err(()) => {
-					let min_weight_to_remove = USER_COINS_WEIGHT_BUDGET;
-					let htlcs_to_remove = min_weight_to_remove
-						/ chan_utils::aggregated_htlc_timeout_input_output_pair_weight(
-							channel_type,
-						) + 1;
+					let htlcs_to_remove = USER_COINS_WEIGHT_BUDGET.div_ceil(
+						chan_utils::aggregated_htlc_timeout_input_output_pair_weight(channel_type),
+					);
 					batch_size = batch_size.checked_sub(htlcs_to_remove as usize).ok_or(())?;
 					if batch_size == 0 {
 						return Err(());
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
index b8565fcaa..884e71784 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
@@ -403,25 +403,7 @@ fn do_connect_block_without_consistency_checks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(
 }
 
 pub fn provide_anchor_reserves<'a, 'b, 'c>(nodes: &[Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]) -> Transaction {
-	let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(nodes.len());
-	for node in nodes {
-		output.push(TxOut {
-			value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
-			script_pubkey: node.wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
-		});
-	}
-	let tx = Transaction {
-		version: TxVersion::TWO,
-		lock_time: LockTime::from_height(nodes[0].best_block_info().1).unwrap(),
-		input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
-		output,
-	};
-	let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
-	let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height, vec![tx.clone()]);
-	for node in nodes {
-		do_connect_block_with_consistency_checks(node, block.clone(), false);
-	}
-	tx
+	provide_anchor_utxo_reserves(nodes, 1, Amount::ONE_BTC)
 }
 
 pub fn provide_anchor_utxo_reserves<'a, 'b, 'c>(